Ethanol from Corn: Neither Renewable nor Reliable
Though the process of producing ethanol was until recently widely believed to use more energy than it created, farming and ethanol conversion practices have improved, causing more to argue that it is a sustainable and more secure alternative to gasoline. For instance, a particularly optimistic study conducted by the USDA – one widely cited by ethanol proponents – estimates that for every unit of energy used to produce ethanol from corn, 1.34 units are created. The study, like others preceding it, estimates this “net-energy value” by assuming the energy used in the production process is derived from the typical mix of energy sources like coal, natural gas, and diesel. Though this approach is consistent with current production practices, it is misleading from a policy-analysis perspective because it ignores the fact that ethanol is promoted as a renewable source of fuel. For instance, the Renewable Fuels Act of 2001 provided large subsides with the aim of boosting the production of domestic ethanol to more than 28.4 billion liters by 2012. More recently, a bi-partisan group of Midwestern senators introduced the BioFuels Security Act that proposes a new renewable fuels standard that calls for the production of 227 billion liters of ethanol and biodiesel by the year 2030. After signing the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which provided more subsidies for ethanol producers, President Bush said: “The bill includes a flexible, cost-effective renewable fuel standard that will double the amount of ethanol and biodiesel in our fuel supply over the next seven years.” Clearly, the promise of a “renewable” automobile fuel is a major driving force behind support for ethanol. Nonetheless, there has been little or no discussion of how much gasoline ethanol could displace if it were produced in a sustainable fashion. Furthermore, though reliability is obviously a central component of an energy security policy, policy makers and researchers have paid little attention to the likelihood of an ethanol supply disruption relative to that of petroleum.
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS ETHANOL?
If the objective of promoting ethanol is to rely more on domestic fossil fuels, then perhaps it would be more efficient to directly use natural gas and liquefied coal to power cars – compatible vehicles have been operating for years on US roadways and we would not disrupt the food supply. If, however, the objective is to power cars with a sustainable, domestically produced fuel – the objective publicly promoted by the
Virtually all ethanol produced in the
IS THERE ENOUGH CORN?
Using the net-energy yield reported in Table 1, we can calculate how much corn would be required to displace just 15% of our gasoline consumption. The estimate requires some assumptions regarding how much corn the country can produce. We assume that the number of metric tons of corn harvested per hectare is 9,400, equal to the 2006 average and the highest level on record. Further, we assume the number of hectares harvested is approximately 30,400,000. This is equal to the 2005 harvest; the second highest level on record. These assumptions imply a total harvest of 28,450,000 metric tons. Finally, consistent with the USDA study, we assume that a metric ton of corn produces 4,000 liters of ethanol.
Table 2 reports the percentage of the all-time-high harvest in the
IS ETHANOL RELIABLE?
Data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service show that since 1960 total corn harvests have increased from about 102 to 267 billion kg. Over the same period, the total number of squared meters harvested has fluctuated around 275 billion, meaning that production gains are almost entirely explained by yield increases. However, researchers have observed that the year-to-year percentage gain in yields has steadily declined over the same period. The rate peaked at between 3% and 5% in the early 1960’s and was less than 1.5% in 2001 – a growth rate that is not expected to even keep up with food demand. Researchers predict that even under the best-case global warming scenario, corn yields are likely to decline by 22% in the short-run. What is more worrisome for an energy security policy that would rely to some extent on a reliable supply of corn, is that researchers believe U.S. corn yield variability is escalating, and the most productive farmers face a higher risk for catastrophic losses due to increased sensitivity to weather conditions.
The point of this discussion is to emphasize that there is little reason to expect corn yield variability to decline. If we assume it will stay constant, we can use historical data to estimate what sorts of ethanol disruptions we can expect in the future. We can then compare corn yield variability to variability in oil imports to see which is more reliable. The period we consider is 1960 through 2005 – a period that included, among other oil shocks, the Six-Day War, the Arab oil embargo, the Iranian revolution, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War. The first step is identifying which distribution best fits the empirical data so we can calculate the standard deviation – a common measure of variability. Using observations for the annual change in corn production and oil imports we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to rank the fit of alternative distributions. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a widely used statistical method used to identify which distribution best fits a set of empirical observations. Table 3 reports the results. The distribution that best fits the corn data is the logistic with mean 3.3% and a standard deviation of 11.9%. The distribution that best fits the oil data is a logistic with mean 5% and a standard deviation of 6.8%. The 90% confidence intervals suggests that in 1 out of every 20 years we can expect corn yields to decline by 31.8%, while we can expect oil imports to decline by 14.9%. Thus, based on history, by displacing gasoline with ethanol we exchange geo-political risk with yield risk and history suggests that yield risk is about twice as high.
A WEAKER SUPPLY RESPONSE?
Relying on ethanol exposes the economy to an entirely new risk – an undesirable link between ethanol supply disruptions and ethanol demand shocks created by their joint dependency on weather. In the case of gasoline, there is no obvious link. For example, during a particularly hot and dry summer the demand and price for gasoline increases as we drive longer distances to escape the heat, spend more time on congested roads, and use our air-conditioning more often. But, the hot weather does not increase the cost of producing gasoline, so increases in the price of gas have an unambiguously positive impact on the supply of gas. The relationship is illustrated in Figure 1. D0 and S1,A are, respectively, the demand and supply curves for gasoline. The two curves conceptually illustrate that the demand for gasoline decreases and the supply of it increases as price increases and vice versa. The intersection of the two curves indicates the price where producers are willing to supply the same quantity that is demanded – the market equilibrium. Suppose Q0 and P0 are the equilibrium quantity and price of gasoline, respectively, before, say, a heat wave. In response to a heat wave, the demand for gasoline shifts outwards to D1. The market supply curve, which depends on the marginal cost of producing gasoline, does not shift since the marginal cost is not affected by the heat wave. The result is the new equilibrium (P1,A, Q1,A). In the case of ethanol, as with gasoline, a heat wave shifts the demand curve out to D1. But, because corn yields are especially sensitive to rainfall shortages during July and high-temperatures during August, the heat wave also shifts the supply curve back as lower corn yields, or increased input costs, increase the marginal cost of producing ethanol. The result of the correlation between demand shocks and supply shortages is to weaken the supply response relative to that of gasoline. For example, a supply-curve shift to S1,B, increases the equilibrium price, relative to the case where marginal costs are not affected by weather, from P1,A to P1,B and reduces the equilibrium quantity from Q1,A to Q1,B. The actual strength of the weather-created link between fuel demand shocks and the price of corn is unknown, but the relationship should be well understood before framing an energy security policy around ethanol.
When we assume the ethanol production process is fully renewable, it would take all the corn in the country to displace about 3.5% of our gasoline consumption – only slightly more than we could displace by making sure drivers’ tires were inflated properly. There are also ethical considerations. In particular, the
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[1] James Eaves is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Finance. He can be contacted at James.Eaves@fsa.ulaval.ca.
Stephen Eaves is the Vice President of Eaves Devices. He can be reached at stephen.eaves@eavesdevices.com.
| TABLE 1 | |
| Ethanol’s Net Energy Value The USDA’s estimate of the net energy gained from producing ethanol from corn. | |
| | Mega joules per liter |
| Energy in one liter of ethanol | 23.4 |
| USDA Credit | 3.8 |
| Grow corn | (6.0) |
| Transport corn to plant | (0.6) |
| Operate plant | (14.4) |
| transport to ethanol to fueling stations | (0.4) |
| Net Energy | 6.0 |
| TABLE 2 | |
| All for Almost Nothing The table reports the percentage of the all-time-high corn harvest required to displace 15% of annual gasoline consumption. The last row reports the percentage of gasoline consumption displaced by devoted all corn to ethanol production. | |
| 15% of annual gasoline consumption (millions of liters) | 98,647 |
| Required ethanol (millions of liters ) a | 123,308 |
| Net liters / metric ton | 103 |
| Required corn (millions of tons) | 1,203 |
| % of all-time high harvested | 423% |
| % of gasoline demand displaced with 100% of all-time high corn harvested | 3.50% |
| a Assuming a 20% efficiency loss | |
| TABLE 3 | ||||
| The Reliability of Corn Relative to Imported Petroleum Summary statistics for the annual percentage change in corn yields and oil imports | ||||
| | Mean | Standard Deviation | 90% confidence interval | |
| Lower | Upper | |||
| Corn Yields | 3.3 | 11.9 | -31.8 | 38.6 |
| Petroleum Imports | 5.0 | 6.7 | -14.9 | 24.9 |